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Abstract
We show how small initial wealth di¤erences between low skilled black and white workers
can generate large di¤erences in their labor-market outcomes. This even occurs in the
absence of a taste for discrimination against blacks or exogenous di¤erences in the distance
to jobs. Because of the initial wealth di¤erence, blacks cannot a¤ord cars while whites
can. Car ownership allows whites to reach more jobs per unit of time and this gives them
a better bargaining position. As a result, in equilibrium, blacks end up with both higher
unemployment rates and lower wages than whites. Furthermore, it takes more time for blacks
to reach their jobs even though they travel less miles. Those predictions are consistent with
the data. Better access to capital markets or better public transportation will reduce the
di¤erences in labor market outcomes.
Key words: Transportation mismatch, job search, spatial labor markets, multiple job
centers, ethnic minorities.
JEL Classi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Urban transit systems in most American cities . . . have become a genuine civil rights
issue-and a valid one-because the layout of rapid-transit systems determines the accessibility
of jobs to the Black community. If transportation systems in American cities could be laid out
so as to provide an opportunity for poor people to get meaningful employment, then they could
begin to move into the mainstream of American life. A good example of this problem is my
home city of Atlanta, where the rapid-transit system has been laid out for the convenience of
the white upper-middle-class suburbanites who commute to their jobs downtown. The system
has virtually no consideration for connecting the poor people with their jobs.
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1986, pp. 325-326)
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence for the United States suggests that, relative to white workers, black
workers: (i) are less likely to own a car, (ii) experience higher unemployment rates and
longer unemployment spells, (iii) earn lower wages, (iv) spend more time commuting to
work, (v) travel less miles to go to their jobs, (vi) search for jobs in a smaller area. See
e.g. Holzer et al. (1994) and Raphael and Stoll (2001). Many papers, some of which are
discussed below, o¤er explanations for a subset of those facts. The aim of this paper is to
construct a model that can simultaneously explain all of them.
Most of the literature has focussed on why blacks experience higher unemployment rates
and earn lower wages than whites. Di¤erent answers have been given to those crucial ques-
tions but the recent debate, especially in the United States, has been focussing on the role
of segregation in explaining these unemployment rate di¤erences. The spatial mismatch hy-
pothesis, rst formulated by Kain (1968), states that, residing in urban segregated areas
distant from and poorly connected to major centers of employment growth, black workers
face strong geographic barriers to nding and keeping well-paid jobs. In the U.S. context,
where jobs have been decentralized and blacks have stayed in the central part of cities, the
main conclusion of the spatial mismatch hypothesis is to put forward the distance to jobs as
the main culprit for the high unemployment rates among blacks.
Since the study of Kain, dozens of empirical studies have been carried out trying to test
this hypothesis. The usual approach is to relate a measure of labor-market outcomes, based
on either individual or aggregate data, to another measure of job access, typically some
index that captures the distance from residences to centers of employment. The bulk of
the evidence suggests that bad job access indeed worsens labor-market outcomes, conrming
the spatial mismatch hypothesis (for literature surveys, see Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998;
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Gobillon et al., 2005; Ihlanfeldt, 2006; Zenou, 2009).
However, spatial mismatch can not explain all the facts described above. In particular,
it cannot explain that black workers travel less miles to work but that it takes more time
for them. It is therefore important to introduce mode choices in the explanation.1 Some
researchers have even put forward the idea of an automobile or transportation mismatch
rather than a spatial mismatch to understand the adverse labor-market outcomes of black
workers in the United States (see, in particular, Taylor and Ong, 1995). Since most blacks use
mass transit,2 the choice of transportation is indeed crucial, in particular, in large American
metropolitan areas where public transportation is not that good (see e.g. Pugh, 1998).3
Indeed, mass transit is a much slower transport mean than private cars in the United States
not only because buses are slower but also because of the unreliability of the transit system
that causes workers to frequently miss transfers and of the fact that many areas are di¢ cult
to reach by public transport. In the United States, in 2000, the average commuting time by
public transit was about twice as high as by car (47.7 versus 24.1 minutes; see Kawabata and
Shen, 2007). As a result, some jobs will be turned down by blacks, not because these jobs
are too far away but because they are di¢ cult to access. So our main point here is that car
1The theoretical models that explicitly model the spatial aspects of the labor market (see, in particular,
Coulson et al., 2001; Brueckner and Zenou, 2003; Smith and Zenou, 2003; Sato, 2001, 2004) have mainly
tried to explain the spatial mismatch hypothesis thus focussing on distance to jobs as the main culprit for
the adverse labor-market outcomes of black workers (for an overview, see Zenou, 2009). There are also some
search models that study how workers determine their maximum area of search (see e.g. Schwartz, 1976 or
Seater, 1979) but neither mode choice nor race are introduced in their models. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the rst that develops a search-matching model where mode-choice decisions a¤ect labor-market
outcomes of black and white workers.
2Using data drawn from the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey, Raphael and Stoll (2001)
show that, in the US, 5.4 percent of white households have no automobile while 24 and 12 percent of
respectively the black and Latino households do not own a car. Even more striking is that they show that
respectively 64 and 46 percent of black and Latino households have only one or zero cars whereas this number
was 36 percent for white households. In Great-Britain, using the 1991 Census data, Owen and Green (2000)
show that people from minority ethnic groups are more than twice as likely as white people to depend on
public transport for commuting journeys (33.2 versus 13.7 percent), with nearly three-fths of Black-African
workers using public transport to go to work. Furthermore, 73.6 percent of the whites use a private vehicle
while this number is only 56.4 percent for ethnic minorities (and 39.6 percent for Black-African workers).
Using the Labour Force Survey for England, Patacchini and Zenou (2005) nd similar results.
3In U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the lack of good public transportation is a real problem. For
instance, the New York Times of May 26, 1998, was telling the story of Dorothy Johnson, a Detroit inner-city
black female resident who had to commute to an evening job as a cleaning lady in a suburban o¢ ce. By
using public transportation, it took her two hours whereas, if she could a¤ord a car, the commute would
have taken only 25 minutes.
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access rather than distance to jobs that make black workers experience high unemployment
rates. In particular, because of urban sprawl and increasing job creation in the suburbs in the
United States (Brueckner, 2000, 2001; Glaeser and Kahn, 2001; Glaeser and Shapiro, 2003;
Glaeser and Kahn, 2004; Nechyba and Walsh, 2004), black families, who mostly reside in the
central part of cities, are more and more isolated from jobs that potentially match their skills
(Wassmer, 2008).4 Given this sprawling, access to good transportation enables residents to
conduct geographically broader job-search, accept o¤ers further away from home, improve
work attendance, and keep the commute burden to a reasonable level. In other words, in
the highly auto-oriented US metropolitan areas, the number of accessible job opportunities
is considerably lower for public transit users than for car users (Hess, 2005; Shen, 1998). It
is then reasonable to hypothesize that car ownership is an important factor in improving the
employment status of welfare recipients. In our model, we show that not having access to
cars has a dramatic impact on blackslabor market outcomes.
To be more precise, rms have no taste for discrimination and ex ante blacks and whites
are located at the same distance to jobs. Apart from the color of their skin, the only dif-
ference between black and whites is an initial wealth di¤erence. We show that this forces
black workers to choose public transportation while whites can a¤ord cars. Since the set of
jobs that can be reached by car is larger than the set that can be reached by public trans-
portation, whites nd jobs faster and experience shorter unemployment spells. Living far
away from ones job could in principle signal car ownership but not if home location is either
unobservable or not veriable (i.e. workers can always provide fake addresses). Employers
do observe the workers type (black or white) and since whites have on average a better
bargaining position, they earn higher wages. This is a standard statistical discrimination
argument (see e.g. Arrow, 1973 or Phelps, 1972).
So, the main idea behind our results is that the set of available jobs for black workers
who mainly use public transportation is smaller than for whites who can travel much faster.
In other words, blacks will refuse some jobs that are not accessible by public transportation
while they would have accepted them if they had a car. Zax and Kain (1996) have illustrated
this issue by studying an interesting natural experiment (the case of a large rm in the
service industry that relocated from the center of Detroit to the suburb Dearborn in 1974).5
Among workers whose commuting time was increased, black workers were over-represented,
4In the United States, between 1970 and 1990, the ratio of jobs to workers in the central city declined from
1.2 to 1 for whites, while for blacks the ratio declined to 0.7 (ORegan and Quigley, 1998). This indicates
that a sizable fraction of black workers are reverse commuters, that is, they live in central cities and work
in the suburban ring.
5See also Fernandez (1994) for a similar natural experiment.
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and not all of them could follow the rm. This had two consequences. First, segregation
forced some blacks to quit their jobs. Second, the share of black workers applying for jobs
to the rm drastically decreased (53% to 25% in 5 years before and after the relocation),
and the share of black workers in hires also fell from 39% to 27%.6 This highlights the fact
that black workers may refuse jobs that involve too long commutes, not necessarily because
they are far away in terms of miles traveled but because they are not reachable by public
transportation.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the model and its assumptions.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium and derives the sources of di¤erences in labor market
outcomes between blacks and whites. Section 4 discusses some policy implications of the
model.
2 The model
2.1 Labor market ows
We consider a continuum of workers and rms. The total mass of workers is normalized
to one. A fraction (1   p) of the workers are blacks and a fraction p are whites. Both are
assumed to be identical apart from the color of their skin and a di¤erence in initial wealth.
We assume that whites have higher wealth ows than blacks, i.e. 
W > 
B, where the
subscript k = B;W denotes the race of an individual. Di¤erences in initial wealth can be
justied on the ground that blacks and whites did not experience the same history in the
United States. As we will see below, 
W and 
B can also be interpreted in terms of access
to the capital market.
Following Salop (1979), we model workersand rmsheterogeneity by means of a circle
along which workers are uniformly distributed over its circumference C of length 1.7 This is
the geographical space and we denote by 0  xij  1=2 the geographical distance between a
worker located in i and a rm located in j.8 It is assumed that workers are unable to change
their residential location. One way to justify this assumption is that homes are less mobile
than jobs (Manning, 2003).
Time is continuous and workers live forever. At each moment in time, a worker can be
6For a survey on these issues, see Fernandez and Su (2004).
7See, among others, Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), Hamilton et al. (2000), Brueckner et al. (2002),
Gautier et al. (2008) for a similar way of modelling heterogeneity.
8Because it is a circle of lenght 1 where distance is measured on both sides, the maximum distance between
a rm and a worker is 1=2.
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either employed or unemployed. All unemployed workers search for a job and we assume
that there is no on-the-job search. Similarly, at each moment in time, a rm can have either
a lled position or an open vacancy. Let uk(i) be the number of type k unemployed workers,
k = fB;Wg, (or equivalently the unemployment rate of type k workers) at location i and
v(j) the number of vacancies (or equivalently the vacancy rate) at location j.
The uniform distribution of workers over the circle implies that uk(i) = uk, 8i 2 C.
It is easy to show (see Lemma 1 of Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999) that, in this case, there
exists a stationary equilibrium with a uniform distribution of vacancies at all locations, i.e.
v(j) = v, for all j 2 C. Gautier et al. (2006) show that this distribution must be unique.
The intuition for this result is that if this distribution is non-uniform than there exists a
protable deviation for rms in non-dense areas (in terms of workers), namely to move to a
denser area.
In standard search-matching models, individuals choose reservation wages by comparing
the values of employment and unemployment and equating them at the margin.9 In the
present model, we include space into a search-matching model and this creates a new decision
for job seekers and rms. Workers must now also decide how large the area of search is and
rms where to locate, given the location of workers.
To be more precise, search is random and the number of contacts between workers and
rms is given by:
M(uB + uW ; v) M:
As usual (Pissarides, 2000), M(:) is assumed to be increasing in its arguments, concave and
exhibits constant returns to scale. Let  = v= (uB + uW ) be labor-market tightness. The
contact rate for type k workers with a vacancy is given by:
M
uB + uW
 m () (1)
The contact rate of a vacancy with a type k worker is given by:
M
v
uk
uB + uW
=
uk
uB + uW
m ()

By using the properties of the matching function, it is easy to see that
m0() > 0 and
@ [m()=]
@
< 0 (2)
since more vacancies increase the rate at which workers nd a job and decrease the rate at
which rms ll a vacancy. We also assume the standard Inada conditions on M(:), which
ensure that lim!+1m() = lim!0m()= = +1, lim!0m() = lim!+1m()= = 0.
9See e.g. Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissarides (2000).
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We can now model precisely the matching process between a worker of type k and a rm.
For a worker, a match will occur if and only if:
Matchuk!v = m()| {z }
Random contact
 2bxk|{z}
Probability contact is acceptable
A match is the product of a contact rate and an acceptation rule. Independently of race, job
contacts arrive randomly to workers at rate m() (for example, workers read newspapers and
observe advertisements). For a given job contact, workers must decide to apply or not to this
job, depending on its location. This second stage depends on the chosen transport mode.
Observe that the term bxk is multiplied by 2 because each worker considers the distance to
jobs from both sides of his/her location.
The rate at which vacancies match with a type k worker is given by:
Matchv!uk =
uk
uB + uW
m ()
| {z }
Random contact
 2bxk|{z} :
Probability contact is acceptable
First, rms advertise their jobs. They are then contacted by workers and will o¤er a job
only to type k workers located within a distance x  bxk.
We assume that jobs are destroyed at an exogenous rate  so the steady state conditions
for type k workers are given by:
2m () bxkuk = ek; (3)
where ek is the employment level (or rate) of workers of type k. Finally, normalizing the
labor force to one implies that:
uB + uW + eB + eW = 1: (4)
From, (3), (4) and the denition of p we can derive the following steady state relationship:
2m () bxkuk =  (p  uk) ;
so that:
uB =
 (1  p)
 + 2bxBm() ; (5)
uW =
p
 + 2bxW m() : (6)
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2.2 Asset values of the various labor market states
Contrary to the standard assumption in urban economics where only one employment center
prevails (see e.g. Fujita, 1989; Zenou, 2009), here there is a continuum of job locations and
jobs are uniformly distributed around the circle. Over their lifetime, workers change jobs
but not their residential location so that distance to jobs changes stochastically over time.
As a result, on average, over their lifetime, the physical distance to jobs is the same for all
workers of type k.10
Let 
k be the per-period wealth ow that a worker has access to, either through family
funds or through the capital market. All unemployed workers receive unemployment benets
b (this can also be interpreted as home production) and pay a ow cost fk of using trans-
portation mode k.11 The cost fk includes insurance, petrol, lease contract and maintenance
for car owners (i.e. fW ) and a monthly public transportation card for mass transit users (i.e.
fB). Workers can only choose one transportation mode, either for commuting to work (when
they are employed) or for job search and shopping (when they are unemployed). So for
both car owners and public transport users, the ow cost fk will be the same independently
of their employment status. All workers are risk neutral. Thus, an unemployed worker of
type k obtains instantaneous utility 
k + b  fk; while an employed worker, earning wk and
working at a geographical distance x, obtains instantaneous utility 
k + wk   Tk(x), where
Tk(x) is total commuting cost at distance x. As we will see below, wages do not depend on
x because the residential location of each worker is not directly observable.
Let  be a positive coe¢ cient and tk(x) the time it takes to commute to jobs when residing
at distance x. This implies wktk(x) represents the total time cost for a person residing at
10This is why we do not introduce land rent in this model since it would not depend on distance to jobs
and will have the same value at each location. Therefore, it will not a¤ect the results of the model.
11Because it will be shown below that there is a one-to-one correspondence between race and transport
mode, subscript k denotes both race and transport mode.
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a distance x from her job.12 Then, Tk(x) is given by:
Tk(x) = fk + wk tk(x) (7)
We show below (in Section 3.4) that, because 
W > 
B, there exists an equilibrium where
even the most wealthy black workers (the ones who have been employed most of the time)
cannot a¤ord a car while the least wealthy whites (those who have experienced the longest
unemployment spells) can. So, from now on, when we talk about transportation issues,
k = B implies public transportation while k = W implies cars. As a result, fk is the non-
time cost of transportation. We assume that switching transport mode is su¢ ciently costly
so once a transportation mode decision is made, it is always optimal to stick to it even when
one becomes unemployed (see Section 3.4). Naturally, we assume that fW > fB, it is more
costly to have a car than to use public transportation. As usual in this type of model, the
wage represents the opportunity cost of time. Let k be the (average) speed of a trip to work
for a worker of type k. Then,
tk(x) =
x
k
: (8)
We assume that W > B. Indeed, k not only measures how fast the transport mode is
but also the smoothnessof the transportation system. As stated in the introduction, it is
well-documented that in large U.S. cities, there is a lack of good public transportation.
In this context, distance to jobs can be measured in terms of either physical distance x
(i.e. number of miles) or time distance tk(x) (i.e. hours). In other words, two workers using
di¤erent transport modes, will not reach the same physical distance during the same time.
Let Uk be the expected discounted lifetime utility of an unemployed worker13 of type k
and Ek(x;wk) be the expected discounted lifetime utility of an employed worker of type k
living at a distance x from her job and earning a wage wk. Then:
rUk = 
k + b  fk +m()

2
Z bxk
0
[Ek(x;wk)  Uk] dx

: (9)
12This is the common way of modelling transport cost in the transport mode choice literature; see for
example LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) and Sasaki (1990). For simplicity and without loss of generality, we
have omitted in (7) the variable part of the commuting cost (i.e. the pecuniary commuting cost). Observe
however that, in a more general model, the link between commuting costs and the wage paid is achieved
through a labor-leisure choice, which implies that a unit of commuting time is valued at the wage rate (see,
for example, Fujita, 1989, Chapter 2). However, such a model is cumbersome to analyze, and it is likely not
to yield additional insights beyond those available from our simpler approach, which is consistent with the
empirical literature that shows that the time cost of commuting increases with the wage (see, e.g. Small,
1992, and Glaeser et al., 2008).
13To save on notation we leave out subscript i when there is no possibility of confusion.
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where r 2 (0; 1) is the discount rate, and bxk is the maximum geographical distance a worker
is willing to travel (beyond bxk all jobs will be turned down by the unemployed workers).
First observe that Uk does not depend on x because search is random (i.e. workers just read
newspaper advertisements) so rms cannot sort workers by locations. When a worker of
type k is unemployed today, her instantaneous utility is 
k + b  fk. She meets vacancies at
rate mk() and a fraction 2bxk of the vacancies are located at an acceptable distance from the
worker. All jobs beyond distance bxk will be turned down. When a worker accepts a job o¤er
at distance x from her residential location, she obtains a wealth increase of Ek(x;wk)  Uk.
The asset value for an employed worker who is employed at distance x from her home is
given by:14
rEk(x;wk) = 
k + wk

1   x
k

  fk    [Ek(x)  Uk] : (10)
Equation (10) has a standard interpretation. When a worker of type k is employed today, she
works at a distance x and she obtains an instantaneous utility equal to 
k+wk (1  x=k) 
fk. Then, this worker can lose his job with probability  and experience a reduction in wealth
equal to Ek(x)  Uk.
Next, we present the Bellman equations for the rm. Let y be the productivity of a
worker and let  denote the rms search cost per unit of time. Since we assume constant
returns to scale production, prots do not depend on rm size so we can think of all vacancies
to be single worker rms. The expected discounted lifetime utility of a rm with a lled job
and a rm with a vacancy, respectively denoted by Jk and V , are given by:
rJk (wk) = y   wk    (Jk   V ) ; (11)
rV =   + 2m ()
 (uB + uW )

uB
Z bxB
0
(JB   V ) dx+ uW
Z bxW
0
(JW   V ) dx

: (12)
According to (11), a workersproductivity y does not depend on her distance to the jobs,
x. As a result, all employed workers are in terms of their productivity, identical from the
rmsviewpoint. However, as we will show below, white workers can bargain a higher wage
because they have a better outside option due to the fact that bxW > bxB. This implies that
rms prefer black workers over white workers, but still hire white workers because it is more
protable to hire them than to wait for a black worker to arrive.
14For the model to make sense, we assume throughout that  < 2B since this guarantees that 1 > x=k,
8x 2 [0; 1=2] and k 2 fB;Wg.
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3 The steady-state equilibrium
A (steady-state) labor market equilibrium consists of labor market tightness, wages, un-
employment levels and a maximum traveling distance, bxW for black and white workers
(wB; w

W ; bxB; bxW ; uB; uW ; ) such that, given the matching technology, all agents (workers
and rms) maximize their respective objective function. Labor market tightness is deter-
mined by a free-entry condition, wages by Nash bargaining, and maximum traveling distance
by an indi¤erence condition between the value of unemployment and the value of employ-
ment at the maximum acceptable distance. Finally, unemployment and vacancy levels follow
from equilibrium labor market tightness and a steady-state condition on unemployment.
3.1 Labor demand
Firms enter in the labor market up to the point where they make zero (expected) prots,
i.e. V = 0. Using (11) and (12), we can write:
Jk =
y   wk
r + 
; (13)
uBbxBJB + uW bxWJW
uB + uW
=

2m ()
: (14)
Combining (14) and (13) yields
uBbxB (y   wB) + uW bxW (y   wW )
uB + uW
=
 (r + )
2m ()
: (15)
For given wages wB and wW , we can derive the direct relationship between bxk and . By
di¤erentiating (15), we obtain:
@
@bxW > 0 @@bxB > 0:
This result is quite intuitive. When the area of search increases so that workers are ready to
accept jobs located further away, rms create more jobs (or equivalently more rms enter in
the labor market) because they have more chance to ll up a vacancy since workers are less
picky.
3.2 Wage determination
The total intertemporal surplus is shared through a generalized Nash-bargaining process
between the rm and the worker. As mentioned before, we assume that rms either do not
11
observe the location of workers or more precisely, their x (the distance between the workers
and the rms location) or that their location is not veriable because if a worker living in
location i would earn more than the same worker living in location i0, workers in location i0
would have incentives to report a fake address in location i.
As a result, a worker and a rm only bargain over observable factors.15 However, even
if rms do not know the exact location of each worker, they know that blacks use public
transportation while whites use cars to commute (this will be shown below). In other words,
rms do not observe x but they observe bxB and bxW . Since traveling time is non-veriable,
it is not part of the wage negotiation. As a result, in the wage bargaining, the value of
employment is not given by (10) but by:
rEdk = 
k + wk   fk   

Edk   Udk

; (16)
where Udk , the disagreement payo¤ for the unemployed worker during bargaining is still
given by (9) while Ek(x;wk) is replaced by Edk(x). Hence, during the bargaining process, the
actual x does not matter since only the average x per type k is taken into account. This is a
standard statistical discrimination argument. The match surplus of workers that is relevant
for the wage bargaining is thus Edk   Udk while the surplus for the rms is: Jk   V , which
reduces to Jk because of the free entry condition. Nash wage bargaining then implies that:
(1  ) Edk   Udk  =  Jk; (17)
where 0    1 denotes the bargaining power of workers. In part A of the Appendix, we
show that (17) implies:
wk =
(1  ) (r + ) b+  [r +  + 2m()bxk] y
r +  + 2 m()bxk : (18)
For a given , wages are increasing in the unemployment benet b, the workersproductivity
y, and the workersbargaining power . More interestingly, for a given , by di¤erentiating
(18), we have:
@wk
@bxk = 2 (r + )  m() (1  ) (y   b)[r +  + 2 m()bxk]2 > 0: (19)
When the area of search bxk increases for type k workers, they have a better outside option
and therefore can bargain higher wages. Since labor-market tightness (i.e. job creation) for
blacks and whites is the same and equal to , bxW > bxB, implies that white workers earn
higher wages than black workers. In other words, by increasing the area of search, car access
increases wages. This is a well-documented fact (see e.g. Gurley and Bruce, 2005).
15See also Gautier (2002) for a similar approach.
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3.3 Maximum distance to jobs
We must nally determine the maximum commuting distance a worker is willing to accept,bxk. In order to determine bxk, we use the asset values of unemployment and employment
given by (9) and (10). Formally, bxk is implicitly dened by the home-work distance that
makes the worker indi¤erent between being employed or remaining unemployed:
Ek(bxk; wk)  Uk = 0: (20)
In part B of the Appendix, we show that (20) is equivalent to:
m()wk
k
bx2k + wk (r + )k bxk   (wk   b) (r + ) = 0: (21)
It is easy to verify that there is a unique positive solution to this equation that we denote bybxk. We show in part B of the Appendix that a condition for both bxW < 1=2 and bxB < 1=2
and the net wage to be strictly positive is (33). Note that if bxk  1=2, for k = B;W , then
there will be a trivial equilibrium where all workers, whatever their type k, accept all job
o¤ers. We also show in part B of the Appendix that, for a given ,
@bxk
@k
> 0: (22)
Indeed, when people use a faster transport mode, they also accept jobs involving longer
commutes. If whites mainly use cars while blacks use public transportation, then this implies
that bxW > bxB.16
3.4 Transport mode decision
We now derive su¢ cient conditions for whites to choose cars and blacks to choose public
transport. All whites use cars if they can a¤ord it and if no individual white worker reaches
a higher utility by using public transport even if rms believe she travels by car. Blacks
will always use public transport if they cannot a¤ord a car but can a¤ord to use public
transportation.
16The positive root of bxk is increasing and convex in wk while, if we consider the relationship between bxk
and wk in (18), we obtain an increasing and concave function in wk. This means that we cannot rule out that
there may exist multiple (at most 2) equilibria. However, in our numerical simulations, for all reasonable
parameter values that we tried, we only found one positive (bxk,wk) equilibrium pair. Moreover, even if there
exist two equilibria, in both of them, the fast transport mode users have a higher wage and search over a
larger area so that our main results (Proposition 1) remain unchanged.
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The highest income that a black worker can obtain is when she is employed forever and
perfectly matched to a rm (i.e. x = 0). So, no black worker can a¤ord a car if:

B + wB < fW (23)
The worst labor market state for a black worker is unemployment (in that case x does not
matter). As a result, blacks can always a¤ord public transport if:

B + b > fB (24)
Since we assumed that all workers can use exactly one transport mode, we can rule out that
a worker chooses not to invest in transportation and simply collect b.
For whites, we need a condition that guarantees that all of them own a car. If the poorest
white (who is unemployed) can a¤ord a car, then they all can. So a su¢ cient condition for
all whites to own cars is:

W + b > fW (25)
Combining these three conditions gives:
fB   b < 
B < fW   wB < fW   b < 
W (26)
Finally, we need to show that it is not protable for an individual white worker to switch
to public transport even if employers believe she has a car. Because employers observe
neither car ownership nor residential location directly, they statistically discriminate and
base expectations on aggregate car ownership rates for blacks and whites. When they bargain
with a white worker, they believe that her area of search is bxW if su¢ ciently many whites
own a car and thus o¤er her a wage wW . Let bxpublicW be the maximum acceptable distance for
a deviant white worker who takes public transport. Its value is given by (35) in part C of the
Appendix and we show that bxpublicW < bxW (bxW is given by (21)). In part C of the Appendix,
we also show that a necessary and su¢ cient condition for whites to never deviate and thus
to always have cars is:bxW   bxpublicW 
W + bxW (AIcarW   fW )  bxpublicW AIpublicW   fB > r (fW   fB)2m() (27)
where AIcarW and AI
public
W are the average income of a white worker having a car and using
public transportation, respectively, and are given by (47) and (48).
To sum up, blacks will not use cars if 
B and y are su¢ ciently low, implying that our
model is only relevant for the lower labor market segments (i.e. low-skill workers). Whites
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own cars if 
W is su¢ ciently large. Of course, there are weaker conditions where some blacks
own cars and/or some whites use public transport but as long as a larger fraction of whites
own cars, our results will qualitatively be the same. Finally, if a small fraction of blacks
has equal wealth as white workers, they may still opt for public transportation if rms o¤er
them lower wages because they believe that blacks will not travel by car.
3.5 The steady-state equilibrium
Denition 1 A steady-state equilibrium is a tuple (wB; w

W ; bxB; bxW ; uB; uW ; ) such that
equations (18), (21), (5), (6) and (15) are satised.
Our main result can be stated as follows (the proof can be found in part D of the
Appendix):
Proposition 1 Assume that (26) and (27) hold. Then, white workers use cars while black
workers take public transportation to commute to their workplace. Consequently, whites will
search over a wider area than blacks, i.e. bxB < bxW < 1=2,17 earn a higher wage, i.e.
wW > w

B, and experience a lower unemployment rate, i.e. u

W < u

B.
If there is a wealth di¤erence between blacks and whites, i.e. 
W is su¢ ciently large
compared to 
B, then whites will be able to a¤ord to buy a car while blacks will be forced
to use public transportation. Because of the bad public transportation system in the United
States, black workers have di¢ culties to reach jobs located too far away from their residen-
tial location and therefore they will only accept job o¤ers located relatively close to where
they live. White workers do accept jobs located further away because of their faster and
smoothertransport mode. As a result, whites spend less time unemployed since more job
o¤ers will be acceptable for them and obtain a higher wage because their bargaining position
in better.
Note that the average distance to jobs (not to acceptable jobs) is the same for blacks
and whites and equal to 1=4. In the real-world, this is not true; in most US cities, jobs
are located relatively far away from where blacks live (see the spatial mismatch literature
exposed in the Introduction and the literature survey by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998). So
if we had started with ex ante inequalities in the distance to jobs between blacks and whites,
the di¤erences in outcomes would have been even larger.
17A condition that guarantees that both bxW < 1=2, bxB < 1=2 and the net wage wk(1   x=k) to be
always strictly positive whatever x 2 [0; 1=2], k 2 fB;Wg is (33), which is given in part B of the Appendix.
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To sum-up, our model endogenously shows that, compared to whites, blacks (i) do not
own a car, (ii) experience higher unemployment rates (uB > u

W ) and longer unemployment
spells (1= [2m () bxB] > 1= [2m () bxW ]), (iii) earn lower wages (wB < wW ), (iv) can spend
on average more time commuting to work (bxB= (2B) > bxW= (2W )), (v) travel on average
less miles to go to their jobs (bxB=2 < bxW=2), and (vi) search for jobs over a smaller area
(bxB < bxW ).
Results (iv) and (v) are surprising and not straightforward but are well-documented
features of the spatial labor market of black and white workers. Indeed, even though blacks
are on average further away from jobs, they live closer (in miles) to jobs when they are
employed but spend more time traveling. The time cost per mile traveled is thus substantially
higher for blacks than for whites. There is indeed a di¤erence between commuting distance
and commuting time. In the United States in the central city (where a large fraction of
blacks live), even over shorter distances, travel times are quite long, especially for people
who rely on public transportation. For example, in 1995, the average commute distance for
workers using private transportation was twelve miles, compared to thirteen miles for those
reliant on public transportation. Commute times, however, were more than twice as long
on public transit than for those who used private vehicles - twenty two minutes compared
to forty-two minutes (Hu and Young, 1999). Results (iv) and (v) are due to the lack of car
access among the black population while the fact that blacks are on average further away
from jobs is often attributed to housing discrimination (Ross and Yinger, 2002; Dymski,
2006) and the willingness to live together (Ihlanfeldt and Scadi, 2002). In our model, result
(iv) is not always true since bxB < bxW and B < W . However, if using cars is a much faster
transport mode than public transportation, then this will hold because the rst direct e¤ect
is stronger than the second indirect e¤ect.
Most empirical studies have indeed shown that the mean daily commute is lower for
whites than for blacks (see e.g. Patacchini and Zenou, 2005, for the UK, Chung et al. 2001,
and Gottlieb and Lentnek, 2001, for the US.) while white commuters have longer average
commute distances than blacks (Holzer et al., 1994; Taylor and Ong, 1995). In particular,
using the National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort (NLSY) for 1981 and 1982, Table 1
from Holzer et al. (1994) displays interesting statistics, which conrm results (i)   (v) and
thus Proposition 1.
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Table 1. Search and labor market outcomes for blacks and whites in the US18
White males Black males
Miles traveled to work 8.017 6.977
(11.352) (9.879)
Miles traveled searching bxk 19.923 18.558
(25.328) (22.718)
Time spent traveling to work bxk=2 15.841 18.603
(15.058) (17.482)
Time spent per mile traveled 3.351 4.899
(3.851) (5.963)
Log (wage), 1981 wk 6.080 5.997
(0.393) (0.370)
Log (wage), 1982 wk 6.246 6.112
(0.447) (0.421)
Employment, 1981 1  uk 0.594 0.456
Employment, 1982 1  uk 0.618 0.452
Log (duration of unemployment) 1= [2m () bxk] 1.591 1.838
(0.841) (0.913)
First, Table 1 shows lower employment rates and wages for blacks, as well as durations
of unemployment that are over 25-30 percent higher for blacks than for whites. Second,
blacks spend signicantly more time travelling to work than whites, even though the distance
traveled is lower for blacks. This is certainly due to di¤erent transport modes (in their study,
68.5 percent of white males own a car while this number is 43.8 percent for blacks; also 4.1
percent of white males use mass transit while this number is 18.9 percent for blacks). The
time spent per mile traveled is thus considerably higher for blacks   about 46 percent higher.
Finally, black job seekers have a smaller area of search than whites. Again, following our
model, this is due to di¤erent transport modes between blacks and whites.
4 Discussion and policy implications
We have argued that because of wealth di¤erences, whites use cars to commute whereas
blacks use public transportation. The set of feasible jobs in terms of distance is therefore
larger for whites. This improves their bargaining position and results in higher wages and
18Values given in this table are means while those given in parentheses are standard deviations.
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lower unemployment rates for whites. Allowing workers to vary their search intensity would
only make the di¤erences larger because the returns to search are higher for whites.
All our results are obtained by assuming that rms have no taste for discrimination
and that ex ante blacks and whites are located at the same average distance to jobs. It is
well-documented that both discrimination (Altonji and Blank, 1999) and distance to jobs
(Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998) are important factors that negatively a¤ect the labor mar-
ket outcomes of black workers. Adding these elements in our model would lead to more
pronounced outcomes between blacks and whites.
As in the standard search-matching models (Diamond, 1982, Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999), there are two types of search externalities: negative intra-group externalities (more job
seekers reduce the job-acquisition rate) and positive inter-group externalities (more searching
rms increase the job-acquisition rate). In addition, there are interracial search externalities
due to the fact that there is some asymmetry in the search process between blacks and
whites. Indeed, white workers exert negative externalities on black workers because they
obtain a job at a faster rate than blacks (i.e. bxW > bxB) and are better paid (wW > wB)
which reduces vacancy supply.19
Investments in public transport can have a substantial impact on search activities of low-
income workers and thus on their unemployment rate. Indeed, if labor participation for black
workers is a¤ected by poor access to job locations and poor worker mobility, and if public
transportation services are designed to e¤ectively link workers with areas of concentrated
employment, then increased access to public transit should yield higher levels of employment
in particular for blacks (Sanchez, 1998, 1999; Blumemberg and Manville, 2004).20
Alternatively, programs that help job takers (especially blacks) obtain a used car - a
secured loan for purchase, a leasing scheme, a revolving credit arrangement - may o¤er real
promise and help low-skill workers obtaining a job. This is a standard policy that has been
advocated in the US (see e.g. Pugh, 1998). Stoll (1999) shows that increasing blacksand
Latinosaccess to cars will lead to greater geographic job search. As in our model, this in
turn will lead to higher employment and wages for these groups. Using data from the UK,
Patacchini and Zenou (2005) nd similar results. They nd that, for a given time distance to
jobs (measured by the average commuting time of the employed in a given area), unemployed
white workers search more intensively than unemployed black workers. They also show that
19There is a second order positive e¤ect, namely that a higher bxW has a positive e¤ect on labor market
tightness,  and the blacks also benet from this.
20Researchers studying the relationship between transportation and employment nd that reliable trans-
portation leads to increased access to job opportunity, higher earning, and increased employment stability
(Blumemberg, 2000; Cervero et al., 2002; Ong, 2002; Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1996).
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giving to black workers the mean level of white (time) distance to jobs and white car access
would close the racial gap in search intensity by 50.31 percent. Raphael and Stoll (2001)
also found that raising minority car-ownership rates to the white car ownership rate would
considerably narrow inter-racial employment rate di¤erentials (see also Raphael and Rice,
2002, and Gurley and Bruce, 2005, who found positive e¤ects of car access on employment).21
Also, if one believes that the low rate of car ownership among black families is driven by
discrimination in the automobile insurance and credit markets, then the government should
enforce anti-discrimination laws that prevent such behavior.
Some researchers believe that public funds should be spent helping welfare recipients
secure cars (Blumenberg and Waller, 2003; ORegan and Quigley, 1998; Ong, 2002; Waller
and Hughes, 1999; Shen, 2001). In the United States, the welfare program allows states to
use federal block grants to provide direct purchase assistance for automobiles, to help pay
for insurance, and to provide loans for would-be buyers. Ways to Work, a partnership that
secures two-year loans for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients in
twenty-three cities across seventeen states, reported in 2001 that over 85 percent of its loans
had gone to vehicle purchase (Goldberg, 2001). Early evaluations of the program show that
participants average as much as a 20-percent increase in monthly income once the loan is
received.22 One disadvantage of stimulating car use is that average speed is likely to be
decreasing in the total number of cars.
Our model sheds some light on the policies discussed above. In particular, by providing
the exact mechanism by which car ownership a¤ects the labor-market outcomes of black
workers, it helps designing the appropriate policy aiming at improving the outcomes of
minority workers.
21Since car ownership and employment are likely to be simultaneously determined, most of these papers
either nd instruments or use a natural experiment to obtain a casual relationship. For example, Holzer et
al. (2003) use an expansion of the San Francisco Bay Areas heavy rail system to have an exogenous change
in the accessibility of inner-city minority communities to a concentrated suburban employment center. On
the other hand, Raphael and Stoll (2001) use an instrument variable strategy to overcome the simultaneity
problem between car ownership and employment.
22Tennessee has also recognized the importance of car access for welfare recipients. In addition to a
standard vehicle asset exemption amount, their unique benet program, First Wheels, provides zero-interest
loans for the purchase of a used automobile for program participants and for leavers up to twelve months
after cash assistance payment end. Gurley and Bruce (2005) show that this program has increased the
probability of being employed and leaving welfare.
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Appendix
A Determination of the wage
The value equation (9) can be written as:
rUdk = 
k + b  fk +m()

2
Z bxk
0

Edk   Udk

dx

= 
k + b  fk + 2m()bxk Edk   Udk  : (28)
Now, by subtracting (28) from (16), we obtain:
Edk   Udk =
wk   b
r +  + 2m()bxk : (29)
Plugging the value of Edk   Udk from (29) and of Jk from (13) into (17) yields
(1  )

wk   b
r +  + 2m()bxk

= 

y   wk
r + 

:
By manipulating this expression, we obtain (18).
B Determination of the maximum area of search
First, since the value of employment for type k depends linearly on x, only through traveling
time x
k
, we can write
1bxk
Z bxk
0
Ek(x;wk)dx = Ex [Ek(x;wk)jx < bxk] = Ek [Ex(xjx < bxk); wk] = Ek(bxk=2);
where the last step follows from, Ex(xjx < bxk) = bxk=2. Therefore,Z bxk
0
Ek(x;wk)dx = bxkEk(bxk=2): (30)
This implies that (9) can be written as:
[r + 2m()bxk]Uk = 
k + b  fk + 2m()bxkEk(bxk=2):
If we evaluate (10) at x = bxk=2, we get:
(r + )Ek(bxk=2; wk) = 
k + wk 1   bxk=2
k

  fk +  Uk:
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Combining these two equations leads to:
rUk =
(
k + b  fk) (r + )
r +  + 2m()bxk + 2m()bxkr +  + 2m()bxk


k + wk

1   bxk=2
k

  fk

: (31)
If we evaluate (10) at x = bxk, we get:
(r + )Ek(bxk; wk) = 
k + wk 1   bxk
k

  fk +  Uk:
Using this last equation, (20) can be written as:

k + wk

1   bxk
k

  fk = rUk:
Using the value of rUk in (31), this last equation can be written as:
(
k + b  fk) (r + )
r +  + 2m()bxk + 2m()bxkr +  + 2m()bxk


k + wk

1   bxk=2
k

  fk

= 
k + wk

1   bxk
k

  fk;
which is equivalent to:
m()wk
k
bx2k + wk (r + )k bxk   (wk   b) (r + ) = 0:
There are two roots in this equation but only one is strictly positive. It is given by:
bxk =   (r + )2m() + k2m()wk
s
wk (r + )
k
2
+ 4
m()wk (wk   b) (r + )
k
:
Since wk is not directly a¤ected by k but only indirectly through bxk (see (18)), we have:
@bxk
@k
=
m()wkbx2k + wk (r + ) bxk
2m()wkbxkk + wk (r + )k > 0: (32)
Denote
(bxW ) = m()wW 
W
bx2W + wW (r + )k bxW   (wW   b) (r + ) :
Since bxW > bxB, for bxW < 1=2 and bxB < 1=2, we must check that
(1=2) > 0:
which is equivalent to:

2W

1 +
m()
2 (r + )

> 1  b
wW
:
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Combining this condition with the one that guarantees that the net wage wk(1  x=k) is
strictly positive, 8x 2 [0; 1=2], k 2 fB;Wg, i.e.  < 2B, we obtain
1  b
wW

2 (r + )
2 (r + ) +m()

W <

2
< B; (33)
which is feasible since

1  b
wW
 h
2(r+)
2(r+)+m()
i
< 1.
C Condition for whites to prefer cars
We need to verify that whites always prefer to use a car over public transportation because
the net benets of a car exceed its net cost. Therefore, we dene the following steady-state
value function of an unemployed white worker having a car:
rU carW = 
W + b  fW +m()

2
Z bxW
0
[EcarW (x;wW )  U carW ] dx

(34)
which is (9). Let bxpublicW be the maximum acceptable distance of a deviant white worker who
travels by public transport. Observe that this white person still earns the same wage wW as
other whites who use cars because rms do not observe transport mode directly and expect
that all whites use cars. This is a standard statistical discrimination argument. The values
of bxpublicW can be calculated in a similar way as in (21) and are implicitly dened by:
m()wW 
B
bxpublicW 2 + wW (r + )B bxpublicW   (wW   b) (r + ) = 0 (35)
Since B, the speed of the public transportation system, is lower than W , the speed of
cars and since @bxk
@k
> 0 (see (22)), it should be clear that bxpublicW < bxW  bxcarW . We can
therefore write the steady-state value function of this deviant white worker who uses public
transportation as:
rUpublicW = 
W + b  fB +m()
"
2
Z bxpublicW
0
h
EpublicW (x;wW )  UpublicW
i
dx
#
(36)
Note that this is the most favorable case for an individual white worker who takes public
transport since she has a wage of wW but pays the lowest transportation fee fB. So if this
person prefers to have a car rather than using public transportation, then there does not
exist an equilibrium where all white workers use cars. Again, the underlying assumption
based on statistical discrimination is that employers do not directly observe the transport
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mode and the location of each worker but they believe that all white workers have cars.
The only disadvantage of using public transportation for a deviant white worker is the
smaller set of jobs that is available, i.e. bxpublicW < bxW . The steady-state value functions of
respectively an employed non deviant white worker who has a car and a deviant who uses
public transportation are given by:
rEcarW (x;wW ) = 
W + wW

1   x
W

  fW    [EcarW (x;wW )  U carW ] (37)
rEpublicW (x;wW ) = 
W + wW

1   x
B

  fB   
h
EpublicW (x;wW )  UpublicW
i
(38)
The condition that guarantees than whites always prefer a car over public transportation
can be written as: U carW > U
public
W . Since U
car
W and U
public
W do not depend on x, (34) and (36)
can be written as:
[r + 2m()bxW ]U carW = 
W + b  fW + 2m()Z bxW
0
EcarW (x;wW )dx (39)
h
r + 2m()bxpublicW iUpublicW = 
W + b  fB + 2m()Z bxpublicW
0
EpublicW (x;wW )dx (40)
Given than bxW > bxpublicW (whites know that if they use cars then bxW > bxpublicW ), we have: r +
2m()bxW > r + 2m()bxpublicW . As a result, using (39) and (40), the condition U car > Upublic
can be written as:
2m()
"Z bxW
0
EcarW (x;wW )dx 
Z bxpublicW
0
EpublicW (x;wW )dx
#
> fW   fB (41)
Using a similar argument as in (30), we can writeZ bxk
0
Ek(x;wk)dx = bxkEk(bxk=2) (42)
which we use to write (39) and (40) as:
[r + 2m()bxW ]U carW = 
W + b  fW + 2m()bxWEcarW (bxW=2) (43)h
r + 2m()bxpublicW iUpublicW = 
W + b  fB + 2m()bxpublicW EpublicW (bxpublicW =2) (44)
Equation (42) also implies that (41) can be written as
2m()
hbxWEcarW (bxW=2)  bxpublicW EpublicW (bxpublicW =2)i > fW   fB (45)
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If we now evaluate EcarW (x;wW ) and E
public
W (x;wW ), dened by (37) and (38), at x = bxk=2,
we obtain:
(r + )EcarW (bxW=2; wW ) = 
W + wW 1   bxW=2W

  fW +  U carW
(r + )EpublicW (bxpublicW =2; wW ) = 
W + wW
 
1   bxpublicW =2
B
!
  fB +  UpublicW
Using (43) and (44), these two equations are equivalent to:
rEcarW (bxW=2; wW ) = 
W   fW + b+ [r + 2m()bxW ]wW

1   bxW =2
W

[r +  + 2m()bxW ]
rEpublicW (bxpublicW =2; wW ) = 
W   fB + b+
h
r + 2m()bxpublicW iwW 1   bxpublicW =2B h
r +  + 2m()bxpublicW i
Plugging the above two equations in (45), leads to:

W
bxW   bxpublicW + bxW
h
b+ wW

1   bxW
2W

(r + 2m()bxW )i
r +  + 2m()bxW
 
bxpublicW hb+ wW 1   bxpublicW2B r + 2m()bxpublicW i
r +  + 2m()bxpublicW (46)
>
r (fW   fB)
2m()
+ bxW fW   bxpublicW fB
Observe that
ucarW =

r +  + 2m()bxW
and
upublicW =

r +  + 2m()bxpublicW
are the probabilities to be unemployed for respectively a non-deviant white who takes the
car and a deviant white worker who takes public transportation. Note that ucarW < u
public
W
since bxW > bxpublicW . Therefore, (46) can be written as:

W
bxW   bxpublicW + bxW ucarW b+ (1  ucarW )wW 1   bxW2W

 bxpublicW
"
upublicW b+

1  upublicW

wW
 
1   bxpublicW
2W
!#
>
r (fW   fB)
2m()
+ bxW fW   bxpublicW fB:
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Denote the average income in each case by:
AIcarW = u
car
W b+ (1  ucarW )wW

1   bxW
2W

(47)
and
AIpublicW = u
public
W b+

1  upublicW

wW
 
1   bxpublicW
2W
!
(48)
As a result, the inequality above reduces to:bxW   bxpublicW 
W + bxW (AIcarW   fW )  bxpublicW AIpublicW   fB > r (fW   fB)2m()
which is (27). Observe that we have shown that: U carW > U
public
W , which, using (41), automat-
ically implies that EcarW > E
public
W .
D Proof of Proposition 1
Note that @bxk
@k
> 0 (see (32)). Since whites use a faster transport mode than blacks, i.e.
W > B, this implies that bxW > bxB. Furthermore, since we have seen that @wk@bxk > 0 (see
(19)), this implies that wW > w

B. Finally, it immediately follows from (5) and (6) that
uW < u

B.
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